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Abstract
This paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity
is uncertain. We provide su¢cient conditions of a general nature under which the licensor prefers
to use a per-unit royalty contract. In particular we show that this is the case for the holders
of weak patents if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensees unit cost on the
equilibrium industry prot is positive. The latter condition is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp.
Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous (resp. di¤erentiated) products under general assumptions
on the demands faced by rms. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the literature
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the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Arrow (1962), analyzing the licensing contracts o¤ered by patent
holders has become an important topic in the economics of innovation and technology di¤usion.
Arrow compared the revenues that an outside innovator obtains from licensing a cost-reducing inno-
vation to a competitive industry and to a monopolistic industry. He showed that when a per-unit
royalty is charged, a perfectly competitive industry generates higher licensing revenues than a mo-
nopolistic one. Subsequently, Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986)
analyzed di¤erent licensing mechanisms (xed fee, auction and per-unit royalty) when the potential
licensees are members of an oligopoly. A key insight of the theoretical literature that has built on
those seminal papers is that the optimal licensing mechanism depends on many factors, including
the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether the
patent holder is active or not in the downstream market. These three factors have been shown to be
critical in the sense that predictions regarding the optimal mechanism can be completely overturned
by varying any of them.1
A common feature of the existing papers on the comparison of di¤erent licensing mechanisms is
that patents are viewed as certain or ironclad rights, the validity of which is unquestionable. This
clearly contradicts what we observe in practice: about half of the patents that are challenged before
US courts are invalidated (Allison & Lemley, 1998).2 It is now largely recognized that a patent is
not a perfectly enforceable right, as are other forms of property. Patents correspond much more to
uncertain or probabilistic rights because they only give a right to try to exclude by asserting the
patent in court (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Shapiro, 2003; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Moreover,
this uncertainty is strengthened by the fact that many applications are granted patent protection
by the patent o¢ce (PO) even though they probably do not meet one or several of the statutory
requirements: belonging to the patentable subject matters, utility, novelty and non-obviousness (or
inventiveness). As a result, some of the uncertain patents are weak in the sense that they have a
high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged by a third party.
The proliferation of uncertain patents is due to several reasons. First, the major patent o¢ces
(USPTO, EPO and JPO) have insu¢cient resources to ensure an e¤ective review process for the huge
and growing number of patent applications (Friebel et al., 2006). Second, mistakes are unavoidable
because the patentability requirements are di¢cult to assess, especially for newly patentable subject
matters such as software, business methods and research tools. Third, the incentives provided to the
1For instance, it has been shown that under Cournot competition with homogeneous products, xed fees dominate
per-unit royalties when the licensor is an industry outsider (Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992).
However, the reverse result holds if the licensor is an industry insider (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998; Kamien and Tauman,
2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007, 2012). Furthermore, under price competition with di¤erentiated products,
per-unit royalties dominate xed fees when the products are close substitutes or, if not, when the size of the cost
reduction is small, while the reverse holds if the products are weak substitutes and the innovation is large (Muto,
1993). The results are quite di¤erent if one considers the same di¤erentiated product environment but assumes that
rms compete in quantities instead of prices (Wang, 2002).
2This concerns the patent disputes that are not settled prior to the court judgement.
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examiners are inadequate for making them fully prosecute and reject applications that do not meet
the standards (Farrell and Merges, 2004; Langinier and Marcoul, 2009; Lei and Wright, 2010).
This paper investigates the optimal licensing mechanism from the perspective of a licensor holding
an uncertain patent and facing the threat of patent litigation. We consider a model in which a patent
holder makes a license o¤er to potential licensees who can challenge the patents validity if they do
not accept the o¤er. The potential users of the patented technology are assumed to compete with
each other in the output market but the type of competition between them is not specied.3
We focus throughout the paper on the case when the patent holder prefers to deter litigation
rather than accomodate it. This scenario is supported by both theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence that we discuss in detail in Section 3. Moreover, when the patent holder nds it optimal to
accomodate litigation then it is maximizing its licensing revenues should the patent be ruled valid.
Therefore, it is essentially acting as the holder of an ironclad patent. In that case, the problem
of choosing a licensing mechanism for an uncertain patent is the same as its (extensively studied)
counterpart for an ironclad patent.
In our baseline model the licensing contracts can involve the payment of either xed fees or per-
unit royalties. We show that two opposite forces drive the patent holders choice between these two
instruments. On the one hand, the use of per-unit royalties allows the patent holder to increase the
size of the aggregate prots (the sum of the licensors and licensees prots) by relaxing competition
between the licensees. Per-unit royalties have this e¢ciency e¤ect whenever a mild condition on
the strategic e¤ect of marginal costs on the licensees prots is satised. On the other hand, xed
fee licensing results in a lower prot for a rm that challenges the patent but fails to invalidate it.
This punishment e¤ect makes the expected payo¤ of a challenger lower when xed fees are used.
Therefore, the rent that the patent holder has to leave to the licensees for litigation to be deterred
is lower under a xed fee contract than under a per-unit royalty contract.
When an unsuccessful challenger is driven out of the market under both types of contracts, there
is no punishment e¤ect. In that case, the patent holder chooses the mechanism that maximizes the
aggregate prots, i.e. the per-unit royalty mechanism. However, when the punishment e¤ect is at
work, per-unit royalties will be preferred by the patent holder only if the magnitude of the latter is
lower than that the magnitude of the e¢ciency e¤ect. We show that this holds for su¢ciently weak
patents. The key reason for this is that the punishment e¤ect is a second-order e¤ect for weak patents
while the e¢ciency e¤ect is a rst-order one. We also show that the superiority of per-unit royalty
contracts for the licensing of weak patents remains true in three extensions of our baseline model
that account for (i) litigation costs, (ii) the possibility of using two-part tari¤ contracts, and (iii) the
possibility that the patent holder competes against the licensees in the output market.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature:
1. The literature that compares various licensing mechanisms.4 Our contribution is to extend
3We assume only that a unique equilibrium in the competition game exists and set very mild assumptions on the
resulting equilibrium prots (as functions of the unit costs).
4See Bhattacharya et al. (2012) for a recent survey on the licensing of ironclad patents and other R&D arrangements.
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that comparison to patents whose validity is uncertain. This issue deserves scrutiny in light of the
growing proliferation of uncertain patents and, in particular, weak ones.5 Our main result can be
seen as a novel justication, based on the uncertainty over patent validity, for the use of per-unit
royalties instead of xed fees in licensing contracts. Explaining why patent holders prefer to use
royalty contracts is important because, despite the frequent use of per-unit royalties in practice,6 a
number of seminal theoretical models on licensing have concluded that the optimal licensing contract
should involve the payment of a xed fee (see e.g. Kamien, 1992).7 A key di¤erence with the
literature considering ironclad patents is that the superiority of per-unit royalties for the licensing of
weak patents is a very robust result: It is independent of the type of downstream competition, the
degree of product di¤erentiation and whether the patent holder is active or not in the output market.
2. The literature on the licensing and litigation of uncertain patents (Aoki and Hu, 1999; Farrell
and Shapiro, 2008; Encaoua and Lefouili, 2009; Choi 2010). This literature has been mostly concerned
with the ine¢ciencies stemming from the low private incentives to litigate a weak patent. The social
harm of uncertain patents depends on how they are licensed out and, therefore, we argue that it is
crucial to get a better understanding of the licensing mechanisms the holders of those patents use.8
3. The literature on the e¤ects of cost variations on oligopolists prots (Seade, 1985; Kimmel,
1992; Février and Linnemer, 2004). While the existing literature has focused on the (ambiguous) sign
of the overall e¤ect of cost variations on equilibrium prots, we investigate the sign of the strategic
e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry prots. We show that this sign is unambiguously
positive in the two most usual imperfect competition models under general (and commonly invoked)
assumptions on the demand functions. An ancillary result is that we provide a lower bound on the
overall e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry prots.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
5Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that the inclusion of software and business methods in the patentable subject
matters in the US has resulted in an increase in the share of weak patents among all the patents issued by the USPTO.
6See e.g. Taylor and Silberstone (1973) and Rostoker (1984). In particular, royalties are widely used for the licensing
of standard-essential patents.
7Various other reasons have been put forward in the literature on ironclad patents to explain the use of royalties,
including risk aversion (Bousquet et al., 1998), asymmetry of information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler
and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992; Sen 2005a), moral hazard (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Choi, 2001), product
di¤erentiation (Muto, 1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Caballero-Sanz et al., 2002; Poddar and Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos
and Tauman, 2007), strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002), integer nature of the number of licensees (Sen, 2005b),
variation in the quality of innovation (Rockett, 1990).
8 In Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), the licensor is assumed to o¤er two-part tari¤
licensing contracts. However, in both papers a technical ad hoc assumption on the shape of the (endogenous) licensing
revenue function is made to simplify the analysis by immediately guaranteeing that pure per-unit royalty contracts
are optimal for the licensors of weak patents (in the class of contracts deterring litigation). In sharp contrast to the
former papers, our result that the holder of a weak patent nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty licensing contract
is implied by a mild condition which has a natural economic interpretation and is shown to hold with broad generality
in standard oligopoly models with general demand functions (as are all the assumptions made in our model).
9Besides the three strands of literature discussed above, this paper can also be related to the literature on pre-grant
licensing (see e.g. Gans et al. 2008). The licensing of a technology covered by an uncertain patent and the licensing
of a technology that is not patented yet have in common that they happen before some type of uncertainty is removed
or reduced. However, they are di¤erent in that the public good nature of patent invalidation has strategic implications
that are absent in the case of pre-grant licensing.
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characterizes the licensing contracts that deter litigation. In Section 4 we provide su¢cient conditions
under which the per-unit royalty mechanism is preferred by the patent holder. In Section 5, three
extensions of our baseline model are considered. In Section 6, we show that the assumptions made
on the equilibrium prots in our model and the (su¢cient) conditions ensuring the superiority of
the per-unit royalty mechanism in Section 4 are satised with broad generality for both a Cournot
oligopoly with homogenous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods. Section 7
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an industry consisting of n  2 symmetric risk-neutral rms producing at marginal cost
c (xed production costs are assumed to be zero). A rm P outside the industry holds a patent
covering a technology that, if used, allows a rm to reduce its unit cost from c to c   where  2]0; c[.
We consider the following three-stage game:10
First stage: The patent holder P o¤ers all rms a licensing contract11 whereby a licensee can use
the patented technology against payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; ]12 or a xed fee F  0:13
Second stage: The n rms in the industry simultaneously and independently decide whether to
purchase a license. If a rm does not accept the license o¤er, it can challenge the patents validity
before a court.14 The outcome of such a trial is uncertain: with probability  > 0 the patent is upheld
by the court and with probability 1   it is invalidated. Hence, the parameter  may be interpreted
as the patents quality or the patents strength. If the patent is upheld, then a rm that does not
purchase the license uses the old technology, thus producing at marginal cost c whereas a rm that
accepted the license o¤er uses the new technology and pays the per-unit royalty r or the xed fee F
to the patent holder.15 If the patent is invalidated, all the rms, including those that accepted the
10This game is similar to the one in Encaoua and Lefouili (2009). However we set much weaker assumptions in
the present paper and use this game to conduct a thorough analysis of the optimal licensing scheme from the patent
holders perspective.
11Following Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), we focus on take-it-or-leave-it license o¤ers.
12Farrell Shapiro (2008) recall that under patent law, a licensor can ask for royalties only for use of the patented
technology. Under this rule the royalty r cannot exceed the innovation size . The reason is that a licensee would
always prefer to use the "old" technology rather than pay r >  for the use of the patented technology (see footnote
22 in Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Moreover, setting a royalty higher than the innovation size can trigger an antitrust
investigation. In particular, in Europe, the royalty imposed by the licensor has to be expressly linked to the patent and
reect its actual value, and the European Commission carefully considers if excessive royalties are being charged.
13Section 5.2 extends the analysis to two-part tari¤ contracts.
14For patents granted by the European Patent O¢ce (EPO), the timing is slightly di¤erent. Indeed, any patent
issued by the EPO can be opposed by a third party and the notice of opposition must be led in writing at the EPO
within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent.
15We assume that the patent holder commits not to license an unsuccessful challenger. Note however that our results
will not be a¤ected if post-litigation licensing occurs (because the patent holder cannot commit not to do that) as long
as a patent upheld by the court is licensed in a way that does not leave any surplus to an unsuccessful challenger. This
will always be the case under the xed fee regime. It will also be the case under the per-unit royalty regime as long as
the patent holder nds it optimal to license an unsuccessful challenger at the maximum per-unit royalty it accepts to
pay, i.e. r = . Under the specic setting of Cournot competition with homegeneous goods and linear demand, it can
be checked that the latter holds if the innovation size  is not too large.
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license o¤er can use for free the new technology and their common marginal cost is c  .
Third stage: The n rms produce under the cost structure inherited from the second stage. We
do not specify the type of competition that occurs. We only assume that there exists a unique
equilibrium of the competition game for any cost structure and we set some general assumptions
on the equilibrium prot functions. For this purpose, denote e(k; c) (respectively i(k; c))16 the
equilibrium prot function, gross of any potential xed cost (e.g. a xed license fee) of a rm
producing with marginal cost c  c (respectively with marginal cost c) when k  n rms produce at
marginal cost c and the remaining n  k rms produce at the marginal cost c.17 We assume that the
pre-licensing equilibrium prots of the n rms is strictly positive, i.e. e(n; c) > 0.
We now make the following general assumptions for any given n and k = 1; :::; n:
A1. The equilibrium prots of an e¢cient rm and an ine¢cient rm, i.e. e(k; c) and i(k; c)
respectively, are both continuously di¤erentiable in c over the subset of [0; c] in which i(k; c) >
0: Furthermore, the equilibrium output qe (n; c) when all n rms produce at marginal cost c is
continuously di¤erentiable with respect to c and strictly positive over [0; c].
A2. If the rms are symmetric (in terms of e¢ciency), an identical increase in all rms marginal
costs leads to a decrease in each rms equilibrium prot: @
e
@c
(n; c) < 0.
A3. An ine¢cient rms equilibrium prot is increasing in the e¢cient rms marginal cost: If
i(k; c) > 0 then @
i
@c
(k; c) > 0 and if i(k; c) = 0 then i(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms prot is decreasing in the number of e¢cient rms in the industry: for any c < c and
any k < n it holds that e(k; c) > e(k + 1; c) and i(k; c)  i(k + 1; c):
A5. A rms prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of ine¢cient rms to the subgroup of
e¢cient rms: for any c < c and any k < n it holds that i(k; c) < e(k + 1; c):
As we shall argue in precise detail in Section 6, all these assumptions are satised with broad
generality in the two most widely used oligopoly models with general demand functions.
3 Licenses deterring litigation
If litigation occurs then, with probability , the patent is upheld by the court (thus becoming an
ironclad right) and, with probability 1  ; it is invalidated and the technology can then be used for
free by all rms. Thus, if the patent holder expects its license o¤er to trigger litigation, it should
make an o¤er that maximizes the licensing revenues it will collect if the patent is ruled valid by
the court. The patent holder would then essentially act as if the patent were ironclad. In other
words, the uncertainty over the patents validity does not a¤ect the licensing terms in that scenario.
We therefore consider in what follows only the class of license o¤ers deterring litigation, for which
the uncertainty over patent validity does matter. In doing so, we follow Farrell and Shapiro (2008)
16The superscript "e" (respectively "i") stands for "e¢cient" (respectively "ine¢cient").
17The fact that the prot function for a rm can be dened in terms of the number of rms that use the innovation,
and not which rms use the innovation, relies on an implicit symmetry assumption. For instance, in the context of price
competition with di¤erentiated products, demands must be symmetric (i.e., products are symmetrically di¤erentiated).
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who also focus on license o¤ers such that litigation is avoided because they aim to investigate the
social costs of the uncertainty over patent validity (which is resolved if litigation occurs). Farrell and
Shapiro actually show that focusing on litigation-deterring contracts is much less restrictive than one
might think: they show that the patent hoder nds it optimal to deter litigation (even in the absence
of litigation costs) in (i) a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse demand and costs as
long as the number of licensees is three or more, and (ii) a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear
costs and a linear demand system (or, more generally, linear pass-through) as long as the number
of licensees is two or more. This theoretical nding is supported by empirical evidence: the vast
majority of patent disputes are settled using licensing agreements before a court decides whether the
patent is valid or not (Allison and Lemley, 1998 and Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Also, Zuniga and
Guellec (2009) report that deterring litigation is one of the main motives put forward by rms when
they are asked why they license out their patents.
We start our analysis by determining the license o¤ers that deter litigation under each mechanism.
3.1 Per-unit royalty mechanism
Let us rst examine a rms incentives to challenge the patents validity when the patent holder
makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; ]. A rm that decides not
to purchase a license is always (weakly) better o¤ challenging the patents validity: if no other rm
challenges the patents validity it gets a payo¤ i(n   1; c    + r) + (1  )e(n; c   ) which is
strictly greater than the prot i(n   1; c    + r) it would get by not challenging the patent, and
if some other rm challenges the patents validity then it is indi¤erent between challenging and not.
Thus, a situation where one or more rms do not buy a license and no rm challenges the patents
validity can never be an equilibrium of the second stage subgame. It follows that a license o¤er deters
litigation if and only if it is accepted by all rms.
Assume that the patent holder makes a license o¤er (in the rst stage) involving the payment of
a per-unit royalty r < : Let us show that in this case, any outcome with k  n  2 licensees cannot
be an equilibrium. We have already shown that a situation where not all rms buy a license and no
rm challenges the patent cannot be an equilibrium so we can focus on situations with k  n   2
licensees and at least one non-licensee challenging the patent. Any of the other n   k   1  1 non-
licensees has an incentive to unilaterally deviate by buying a license since it would get an expected
prot of e(k + 1; c    + r) + (1  )e(n; c   ) instead of the strictly lower expected prot
i(k; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ) if it remains a non-licensee. Therefore, any equilibrium of the
second stage subgame involves at least n 1 rms if r < . The latter result extends to the case r = 
if it is assumed, as will be the case from now on, that a rm which is indi¤erent between getting a
license and not buying a license purchases one.
Let us now write the condition under which all rms accepting the license o¤er r is an equilibrium
of the second stage subgame. A rm anticipating that all other rms will purchase a license gets a
prot equal to e(n; c  + r) if it accepts the license o¤er. If it does not and challenges the patents
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validity then with probability ; the patent is upheld by the court and the challenger gets a prot
equal to i(n   1; c    + r) and, with probability 1   , the challenger gets a prot of e(n; c   )
(and so do all other rms). Thus, a rm challenging the patents validity when all other rms accept
the license o¤er, gets an expected prot of i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ): Therefore, all
rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ): (1)
The next lemma characterizes the values of the per-unit royalty set by the licensor that induce
all rms to buy a license (thus deterring litigation).
Lemma 1 Dene ~r() as the unique solution in r to the following equation:
e(n; c  + r) = i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ):
Then all rms accepting to pay a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and and only if r  ~r():
3.2 Fixed fee mechanism
The previous observation that a license o¤er deters litigation if and only if it is accepted by all rms
remains true when the licensor uses a xed fee scheme. For a license o¤er involving the payment of
a xed fee F to be accepted by all rms, the following condition must hold:
e(n; c  )  F  i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
F  

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )

: (2)
The next lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 1 for the xed fee mechanism.
Lemma 2 All rms accepting to pay the xed fee F to use the patented technology is an equilibrium
if and only if F  ~F ()  [e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )]:
4 Optimal licensing mechanism
The optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation solves the following maximization program:
max
r0
nrqe (n; c  )
s.t. r  ~r()
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while the optimal xed fee contract deterring litigation is given by
max
F0
nF
s.t. F  ~F ()
It is obvious that the constraint of the latter maximization program is binding at the optimum. For
the sake of exposition we will also also assume that the constraint of the program dening the optimal
per-unit royalty contract is binding at the optimum.18 Note however that relaxing this assumption
can only strengthen the subsequent results about the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism.
4.1 E¢ciency e¤ect versus punishment e¤ect
Denoting ~Pr () (resp. ~PF ()) the licensing revenues generated by the optimal per-unit royalty (resp.
xed fee) contract deterring litigation, we have
~Pr () = n~r()q
e(n; c  + ~r())
and
~PF () = n ~F () = n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )

This, combined with e(n; c  + ~r()) = i(n  1; c  + ~r()) + (1  )e(n; c  ), yields
~Pr ()  ~PF () = A() +B():
where
A()  n [e(n; c  + ~r()) + ~r()qe(n; c  + ~r())  e (n; c  )]
and
B()   n

i(n  1; c  + ~r())  i (n  1; c  )

The term A() captures an e¢ciency e¤ect : it is the di¤erence between the aggregate prots
generated under the optimal per-unit royalty contract and those under the optimal xed fee contract.
This term is always positive if the following condition holds:
e(n; c0)  e(n; c) >  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) for any c; c0 2 [c  ; c] such that c < c0. (3)
The decomposition
e(n; c0)  e(n; c) =  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) +
 
pe(n; c0)  c

qe(n; c0)  (pe(n; c)  c) qe(n; c)
18 It can be easily shown that this will always be the case for  su¢ciently small.
9
shows that the overall e¤ect of an increase in marginal costs on equilibrium prots can be split into
a cost e¤ect, captured by the term  (c0   c)qe(n; c0), and a strategic e¤ect, captured by the term
(pe(n; c0)  c) qe(n; c0)   (pe(n; c)  c) qe(n; c). The cost e¤ect is obviously negative. Condition (3)
means that the strategic e¤ect of a marginal cost increase on equilibrium prots is positive.
Let us now explain why Condition (3) is su¢cient to ensure that the per-unit royalty mechanism
generates higher aggregate prots than the xed fee mechanism. Per-unit royalties do not a¤ect the
marginal cost of production from an aggregate perspective: the additional marginal cost incurred
by the licensees is fully captured by the licensor. However, they distort the rms price/output
decisions since the e¤ective marginal cost of the licensees increases. The e¤ect of this distorsion
on the aggregate prots is the same as the (previously dened) strategic e¤ect of a marginal cost
increase on the licensees prots. Therefore whenever the latter is positive, per-unit royalties increase
aggregate prots with respect to xed fees.
To the best of our knowledge, Condition (3) has not been studied in the literature on the e¤ects of
cost variations on oligopolists prots which has mainly focused on the overall e¤ect of cost changes
on prots (e.g. Seade, 1985, Kimmel, 1992; Février and Linnemer 2004). In Section 6, we will
establish that this condition is satised with broad generality in the widely used settings of Cournot
competition with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products.
Let us now turn to B(). Since a challenger gets the same prot under both mechanisms if
the patent is invalidated, B() is the di¤erence between the expected prots a challenger would get
under the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation and its xed fee counterpart. It
captures a punishment e¤ect : an unsuccessful challenger gets a (weakly) lower prot under the xed
fee mechanism than under the per-unit royalty mechanism because its licensed competitors are more
e¢cient under the former. Therefore, the rent that the patent holder needs to leave to each licensee
in order to deter litigation is (weakly) lower under the xed fee mechanism.
We can therefore conclude that, under Condition (3), the choice of a licensing mechanism is
driven by two conicting considerations. On the one hand, the e¢ciency e¤ect gives the patent
holder an incentive to use the mechanism that maximizes aggregate prots, i.e. the per-unit royalty
mechanism. On the other hand, the punishment e¤ect provides an incentive to choose the mechanism
that leaves a rent as low as possible to the licensees, i.e. the xed fee mechanism.
While the e¢ciency e¤ect is always strictly positive (under Condition (3)), the punishment e¤ect
is only weakly negative. We will therefore distinguish between the case when it is absent (B() = 0)
and the case when it is at work (B() < 0).
4.2 Optimal mechanism when there is no punishment e¤ect
Assume here that B() = 0. Note rst that this holds if and only if i(n   1; c    + ~r()) = 0
(by A3). In words, a necessary and su¢cient condition for the punishment e¤ect to be zero is that
an unsuccessful challenger gets the harshest possible punishment under the optimal per-unit royalty
contract (and a fortiori under its xed fee counterpart): it gets driven out of the market. In that
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case, the marginal cost of the licensees is irrelevant for an unsuccessful challenger. This scenario is
more likely to hold the more competitive the industry.
The next proposition follows from the analysis in Section 4.1.
Proposition 1 Assume that an unsuccessful challenger is driven out of the market under both mech-
anisms (i.e. i(n 1; c +~r()) = 0). Then the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation
generates higher licensing revenues than its xed fee counterpart if Condition (3) holds.
A simple intuition for this proposition can be provided through an alternative interpretation of
Condition (3): the latter formalizes, in our general competitive setting, the intuitive idea that an
increase in marginal cost relaxes competition. To see why notice rst that Condition (3) also means
that an "articial" increase in all rms marginal costs has a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium prots
in a symmetric industry. The term "articial" refers to a situation in which rms manage to commit to
the prices/outputs corresponding to a higher marginal cost while their e¤ective marginal cost remains
unchanged. Moreover, we will show in Section 6 that, in the specic context of a symmetric Cournot
oligopoly with homogenenous products (resp. Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated products), a key
condition for Condition (3) to hold is that the equilibrium output (resp. price) is decreasing (resp.
increasing) in the marginal cost of production.
With this interpretation in mind, it becomes clear that per-unit royalties allow the patent holder
to relax competition between the licensees, which results in higher aggregate prots. In the absence
of the punishment e¤ect, the choice of a licensing mechanism is fully driven by the e¢ciency e¤ect
and, therefore, the patent holder chooses to use a per-unit royalty contract.
4.3 Optimal mechanism when the punishment e¤ect is at work
Assume now that B() < 0. Then the condition that the e¢ciency e¤ect is positive (A() > 0) is no
longer su¢cient for the per-unit royalty mechanism to dominate the xed fee mechanism. Since the
punishment e¤ect is negative, a per-unit royalty contract will be used only if the magnitude of the
e¢ciency e¤ect is higher than that of the punishment e¤ect (i.e. A() > jB()j). While this may not
be the case on the whole parameter space in our general setting, it turns out that it is always true
for su¢ciently weak patents. The reason is that the e¤ect of leaving more prots to the licensees
under the per-unit royalty mechanism on the patent holders prot, which is captured by B(), is at
most, a second-order term for  su¢ciently small (because B(0) = 0 and B0(0) = 0). In contrast, the
e¢ciency e¤ect A() is a rst-order term (because A(0) = 0 and A0(0) > 0 under Condition (3)).
The next result provides a condition, which is less restrictive than Condition (3), that ensures
the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism for the licensing of (su¢ciently) weak patents.
Proposition 2 For a su¢ciently weak patent, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litiga-
tion provides higher licensing revenues than the optimal xed fee contract deterring litigation if
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  ): (4)
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Condition (4) is a local version of Condition (3) and, therefore, has the same economic interpre-
tation. Section 6 will show the mildness of Condition (4) but, because Proposition 2 provides a local
result, it is not informative regarding the range of patent strength values  for which the per-unit
royalty mechanism is preferred by the licensor when an unsuccessful challenger remains active in the
market. The following example shows that this range can be substantially wide.
Example Consider the special case of Cournot competition with linear demand p = a  Q and
assume that   a c2(n 1) . In that environment 
i(n   1; c   ) > 0, i.e. a challenger would always
remain active in the market should the patent be upheld. Long but straightforward computations
show that a threshold ^ exists such that the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation
generates higher licensing revenues than its xed fee counterpart if  is greater than ^: In this setting,
the parameters a, c and  a¤ect the comparison of ~Pr() and ~PF () only through the ratio
a c

: We
compute ^ for the set of the 1000 pairs
 
n; a c


such that n = 2; 3; :::; 11 and a c

= 2(n   1) + i
where i = 1; 2; :::; 100 and nd values that are all greater than 0:5: More specically all values are
within the interval [0:501; 0:678]. This shows that, even when the punishment e¤ect is at work, the
superiority of the per-unit royalty scheme is not associated only with small values of .
5 Extensions
We now assess the robustness of Proposition 2 by considering three extensions of our baseline model.
5.1 Litigation costs
Let us assume in this section that a rm that challenges the patents validity before a court has
to incur some legal costs C  0.19 It is straightforward that the higher those costs the higher the
licensing revenues the patent holder can extract from the licensees without triggering litigation. This
qualitative observation holds for both mechanisms. However, we show in what follows that, on the
quantitative side, the marginal e¤ect of litigation costs on the patent holders licensing revenues is
higher under the per-unit royalty mechanism than under the xed fee mechanism if condition (4)
holds. This implies that the result in Proposition 2 remains true - and is actually strenghtened - if
the model is extended to include (small) legal costs that any challenger must incur.
Suppose rst that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit
royalty r 2 [0; [ : Note that the inclusion of legal costs in our setting does not a¤ect the fact that
the strategy "not buy a license and not challenge the patents validity" is always dominated by the
strategy "buy a license". Therefore, the only way a patent holder can deter litigation is to make a
19Assuming that the patent holder incurs positive legal costs as well does not alter the subsequent analysis. The
reason is that we focus on the scenario in which the patent holder nds its optimal to deter litigation. Note that
including positive litigation costs for the patent holder actually make this scenario more likely.
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license o¤er that is accepted by all rms. This will be the case if and only if
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C:
It is easily shown the latter constraint is met if and only if r  ~r(; C) where ~r(; C) is the solution
in r to the equation
e(n; c  + r) = i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C
and that, for  and C su¢ciently small, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation
involves the payment of the royalty ~r(; C) (i.e. the constraint is binding). Note also that ~r(; C) is
strictly increasing in both its arguments.
Suppose now that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a xed fee
F  0: Such a license o¤er is accepted by all rms if and only if
e(n; c  )  F  i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C
and, therefore, the optimal xed fee license deterring litigation involves the payment of the fee
~F (; C) = 

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )

+ C:
Let us now compare the licensing revenues derived by the patent holder under the two mechanisms.
Under the optimal per-unit royalty contract, they are given by
~Pr (; C) = n~r(; C)q
e(n; c  + ~r(; C))
and under the optimal xed fee contract, they are given by
~PF (; C) = n ~F (; C) = n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )

+ nC:
Since ~Pr (0; 0) = ~PF (0; 0) ; a su¢cient condition for the existence of ~ > 0 and ~C > 0 such that the
inequality ~Pr (; C) > ~PF (; C) holds for any  < ~ and C < ~C is that
@ ~Pr
@
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@
(0; 0)
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)
The former inequality has already been shown to be equivalent to Condition (4). Surprisingly enough,
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the latter inequality is equivalent to Condition (4) too. Indeed,
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0) = n
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) = n
@r
@C
(0; 0) qe(n; c  ):
Di¤erentiating with respect to C the equation dening ~r(; C) at point (; C) = (0; 0) ; we get:
@r
@C
(0; 0) =   1@e
@c
(n;c )
: Thus,
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) =  
nqe(n; c  )
@e
@c
(n; c  )
:
Hence
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)()
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  ):
Therefore, the result in Proposition 2 is robust - and is actually strengthened20 - in the presence of
relatively small legal costs.
5.2 Two-part tari¤ contracts
Assume in this section that the patent holder can o¤er a two-part tari¤ licensing contract involving
the payment of a xed fee F  0 and a per-unit royalty r  0. The optimal two-part tari¤ contract
F^ () ; r^ ()

deterring litigation is a solution to the following maximization program
max
F0, r2[0;]
n (F + rqe (n; c  + r))
s:t: e(n; c  + r)  F  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ):
Since the objective function is increasing in F , the constraint has to be binding at the optimum.
Therefore, the optimal two-part tari¤ contract

F^ () ; r^ ()

is such that F^ () = e(n; c + r^ ()) 
i(n  1; c  + r^ ())  (1  )e(n; c  ) and r^ () is a solution to
max
r2[0;]

rqe (n; c  + r) + e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r)  (1  )e(n; c  )

s:t: e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ):
Note that the latter constraint could be rewritten as r  ~r(), and that F^ () = 0 if and only
if r^ () = ~r(), i.e. the constraint is binding. The next proposition shows that our nding that
20The free riding problem arising from the public good nature of patent invalidation is amplied when a potential
challenger needs to incur positive litigation costs. The fact that @
~Pr
@C
(0; 0) > @
~PF
@C
(0; 0) under Condition (4) implies
that, under the latter, the per-unit royalty mechanism allows the patent holder to exploit the amplication of the free
riding problem better than the xed-fee mechanism (for weak patents and small litigation costs).
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the holder of a su¢ciently weak patent nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract whenever
Condition (4) holds, extends to a setting where the larger set of two-part tari¤ contracts is considered.
Proposition 3 For su¢ciently weak patents, the optimal two-part tari¤ licensing contract deterring
litigation is a pure per-unit royalty contract if:
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  ):
5.3 Internal patent holder
Let us consider the case where the patent holder is active in the output (downstream) market. More
specically, we assume that one of the n rms operating in the market, say rm 1, gets a patent on
a technology that lowers the unit production cost from c to c  :We assume that n  3 (as we want
to have at least two potential licensees).
Here again, we assume that there exists a unique equilibrium to the competition game for any
cost structure (with identical market prots for rms producing at the same unit cost) and we set
some general assumptions on the equilibrium prot functions. We focus on industry cost structures
that can emerge following the licensing game, that is, situations in which: one rm - the patent
holder - produces at unit cost c   , a number k  n   1 of rms - the licensees - produce at a
unit cost c 2 [c  ; c] and the remaining n   k rms - the non-licensees - produce at unit cost c:
We denote by p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) the equilibrium market prots of the patent holder, a
licensee producing at an e¤ective unit cost c and a non-licensee respectively.
Given the new environment we consider, we need to replace the assumptions A1-A5 made in our
baseline model with the following alternative, but related, assumptions:
A1. The equilibrium prots p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) are continuously di¤erentiable in c over
[0; c] over the subset of [0; c] in which n(c; k) > 0: Furthermore, the function c ! ql (n; c) is
continuously di¤erentiable over the subset of [0; c] in which it is strictly positive.
A2. An identical increase in the costs of all rms but the patent holder decreases each one of those
rms equilibrium prot: @
l
@c
(n  1; c) < 0.
A3. A non-licensees equilibrium prot is increasing in the licensees unit cost: If n(k; c) > 0 then
@n
@c
(k; c) > 0 and if n(k; c) = 0 then n(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms market prot is decreasing in the number of licensees in the industry: for any c < c and
any k < n  1 it holds that p(k; c) > p(k+ 1; c); l(k; c) > l(k+ 1; c) and n(k; c)  n(k+ 1; c):
A5. A rms market prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of non-licensees to the subgroup
of licensees: for any c < c and any k < n  1 it holds that n(k; c) < l(k + 1; c):
The comparison of the innovators overall prot, i.e. the sum of its market prot and licensing
revenues, under the two licensing mechanisms, yields the following result:
Proposition 4 For su¢ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litiga-
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tion generates higher overall prot for the patent holder than its xed fee counterpart if
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  ) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  ): (5)
Moreover, the reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is satised.
To see how Condition (5) compares to its counterpart when the patent holder is not active on the
market, i.e. Condition (4), let us rewrite both of them with the same notations. For that purpose,
let us denote by  (c1; c2; :::; cn) the sum of all rms equilibrium market prots, i.e. the equilibrium
(downstream) industry prot, and qi (c1; c2; :::; cn) rm is output when each rm j = 1; 2; :::; n
produces at unit cost cj : The su¢cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry outsider to
prefer the per-unit royalty mechanism for su¢ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing
c   with the generic variable c):
nX
i=1
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
qi (c; c; :::; c) : (6)
The su¢cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry insider to prefer the per-unit
royalty mechanism for su¢ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing again c    by the
generic variable c, and denoting P the patent holder):
nX
i=1
i6=P
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
i6=P
qi (c; c; :::; c) : (7)
The two inequalities have very close interpertations: Condition (6) means that the strategic e¤ect of
an identical increase in all rms (common) unit cost on the industry prot is positive and Condition
(7) means that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in the costs of all rms but one on the industry
prots is positive (rms being equally e¢cient initially). Note also that both conditions are implied
by the following inequality when it holds for any i = 1; 2; :::; n :
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  qi (c; c; :::; c) : (8)
This condition means that when rms are equally e¢cient initially, the strategic e¤ect of an increase
in one rms unit cost on the industry prot21 is positive.
We next show that Condition (8) holds (i) for standard Cournot competition under complete gen-
erality, and (ii) for Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products under strategic complementar-
ity, provided existence an uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium hold in these two environments.
It then follows that both Conditions (6) and (7) hold since they are implied by Condition (8).
21What we call "industry prot" is the sum of all market prots.
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6 Two standard oligopoly applications
In this section, we provide su¢cient conditions of a general nature on the primitives of the two most
widely used models of imperfect competition, which lead to Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5 and
Conditions (3), (4) and (5) being veried. Since some of the results below are new to the oligopoly
literature, and of some independent interest, we derive them for fully asymmetric versions of the
Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies with linear costs. Accordingly, we also change the notation as
needed, relative to the other parts of the paper.
6.1 Cournot competition with homogeneous products
Consider an industry consisting of n rms competing in Cournot fashion. Firm is marginal cost is
denoted ci (xed production costs are assumed to be zero or otherwise sunk). Suppose the rms face
an inverse demand function P () satisfying the following minimal conditions:
C1 P () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0() < 0 whenever P () > 0:
C2 P (0) > ci > P (Q) for Q su¢ciently high, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
C3 P 0(Q) +QP 00(Q) < 0 for all Q  0 with P () > 0.
These assumptions are quite standard. C3 is the familiar condition used by Novshek (1985) to
ensure downward-sloping reaction curves (for any cost function). It states that each rms marginal
revenue is decreasing in rivals output (see Amir, 1996 for an alternative condition).
Firm is prot function and reaction correspondence are (here, Q i =
P
j 6=i qj)
i(qi; Q i) = qi [P (qi +Q i)  ci] and ri(Q i) = argmax
qi0
i(qi; Q i):
The next proposition provides general conditions under which Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5
hold for a Cournot oligopoly.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions C1-C3,
(a) There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium output qi and prot 

i are di¤erentiable in ci and in cj for any j 6= i:
(c) Firm is equilibrium prot i is decreasing in ci and increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
If in addition, the game is symmetric (with c denoting the unit cost), then
(d) The unique Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.
(e) The equilibrium output q strictly decreases in c.
(f) Per-rm equilibrium prot  decreases in c:
It is straightforward to relate the di¤erent parts of Proposition 5 to Assumptions A1-A5 and
A1-A5. Part (a) is needed to avoid vacuous statements. Assumptions A1 and A1 are implied
by part (b) and the proof of part (e). Assumption A2 follows from part (f) and Assumption A2
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follows from combining part (f) with part (c). Assumptions A3 and A3 are implied by part (c).
Assumptions A4 and A4 follow from repeated applications of part (c), with one rival rms cost
decreasing at a time. Assumptions A5 and A5 follow from part (c).
We now discuss the scope of these assumptions, focusing on parts (f) and (c), the other assump-
tions being well known for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Though intuitive, part
(f) actually has a less universal scope than one might think. Indeed, there is an extensive literature
dealing with taxation in oligopolistic industries and one of its key insights is that a common cost
increase can lead to some rms beneting at the expense of others (Seade, 1985, Kimmel, 1992,
and Février and Linnemer, 2004). More surprisingly, in a symmetric setting, a cost increase may
be benecial to all rms, when the inverse demand function is su¢ciently convex. In light of this
result, known as the cost paradox, part (f) may be viewed as giving su¢cient conditions for this
counter-intuitive e¤ect of taxation not to arise.
Since the cost paradox literature considers cost increases that are common to all rms, it does not
deal with the prot e¤ects of a unilateral cost change, as in the two novel results of part (c). In light
of this discussion, it emerges that ruling out the cost paradox and its plausible implications is one of
the most restrictive assumptions of the present setting. Assumption C3 is then appropriate since it
guarantees existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium and the absence of the cost paradox.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions C1-C3,
(i) Condition (8) and, therefore, Conditions (4) and (5) are veried.
(ii) Condition (3) holds whenever Qm(c  )  Qe(n; c) where Qm(c  ) is the monopoly output
when the marginal cost is c  .
As can easily be seen in the proof, this result requires only that total equilibrium output decreases
with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds universally in Cournot competition with linear costs.
Moreover, it can be easily shown that Qm(c) < Qe(n; c) and that the monopoly output Qm(c) is
decreasing in c, which allows to interpret the condition Qm(c  )  Qe(n; c) as  being not too large.
To get a sense of how restrictive this condition is, consider the special case of a linear inverse demand
p = a   Q. Then Qm(c   )  Qe(n; c) if and only if   n 1
n+1 (a  c). To see why this condition is
not very restrictive, note that in this particular setting an innovation is drastic22 if   (a  c) :
6.2 Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products
Consider an industry consisting of n single-product rms, with constant unit costs c1; c2; :::; cn: As-
sume that the goods are imperfect substitutes. Denoting Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) the demand for the good
produced by rm i; its prot function and reaction correspondence are dened as usual by
i(pi; p i) = (pi   ci)Di(pi; p i) and ri(p i) = argmax
pi
i(pi; p i):
22A process innovation is drastic if the cost reduction it leads to is so large that the user of that technology can act
as an unconstrained monopolist.
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The Bertrand oligopoly is symmetric if the demand functions are symmetric and c1 = ::: = cn , c:
Let Si ,

(p1; p2; :::; pn) 2 R
n
+ j Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) > 0
	
. We assume that for every rm i:
B1 Di is twice continuously di¤erentiable on Si.
B2 (i)@Di
@pi
< 0, (ii)@Di
@pj
> 0 and (iii)
Pn
k=1
@Di(p;p;:::;p)
@pk
< 0 over the set Si.
B3 Di
@2 logDi
@pj@pi
  @ logDi
@pj
@ logDi
@pi
> 0 over the set Si, for j 6= i.
B4
Pn
j=1
@2Di(p1;p2;:::;pn)
@pi@pj
< 0 over the set Si.
These conditions are quite general, and are commonly invoked for di¤erentiated-good demand
systems. They have the following meanings and economic interpretations. For B2, part (i) is just
the ordinary law of demand; part (ii) says that goods i and j are substitutes; and part (iii) is
a dominant diagonal condition for the Jacobian of the demand system, which is required to hold
only at equal prices (see e.g., Vives, 1999). It says that, along the diagonal, own price e¤ect on
demand exceeds the total cross-price e¤ects. B3 says that each demand has (di¤erentiably) strict
log-increasing di¤erences in own price and any rivals price. The exact economic interpretation is
that the price elasticity of demand strictly increases in any rivals price, which is a very natural
assumption (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). B4 says that the Hessian of the demand system has a
dominant diagonal, which is a standard assumption invoked to guarantee uniqueness of Bertrand
equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 or Vives, 1999). B2(iii) and B4 hold that own e¤ects of
price changes dominate cross e¤ects, for the level and the slope of demand, respectively.
The following result provides su¢cient conditions for A1-A5 and A1-A5 to hold here.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions B1-B4,
(a) The Bertrand game is of strict strategic complements, and has a unique Bertrand equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium price pi is increasing in cj for any j:
(c) Firm is equilibrium price pi and prot 

i are di¤erentiable in ci and cj for any j 6= i:
(d) Firm is equilibrium prot i is increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
In addition, if the game is symmetric, then
(e) the unique Bertrand equilibrium is symmetric.
(f) the equilibrium price increases in c:
(g) per-rm equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in c, and decreasing in c.
We leave to the reader the task of matching the di¤erent parts of Proposition 7 to Assumptions
A1-A5 and A1-A5, as this step is quite similar to the Cournot case.
Anderson et. al. (2001) extends the analysis of the e¤ects of taxation to Bertrand competition
with di¤erentiated products, and report analogous ndings on the cost paradox as in the Cournot
case. Since Proposition 7 contains only intuitive results on the e¤ects of cost changes on prots,
one concludes that assumptions B2-B4, which are needed for existence and uniqueness of Bertrand
equilibrium, also preclude any counter-intuitive e¤ects of exogenous cost increases. This result is
more general than those in Anderson et. al. (2001) due to the abscence of concavity assumptions.
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Proposition 8 Under Assumptions B1-B4,
(i) Condition (8) and, therefore, Conditions (4) and Condition (5) are veried.
(ii) Condition (3) holds whenever pe(n; c)  pm(c ) where pm(c ) is the monopoly price when
the marginal cost is c   .
As can be seen from the proof, this result requires only that each rms equilibrium price increase
with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds in Bertrand oligopoly with linear costs whenever
the game is supermodular (i.e, B3 holds). As in the Cournot case, the condition pe(n; c)  pm(c  )
may also be interpreted as  being not too large (for a given level of product di¤erentiation) or,
alternatively, as product di¤erentiation being su¢ciently low (for a given innovation size ).
7 Conclusion
The issue of patent quality is one of the most serious problems facing the patent system. One negative
consequence of the issuance of weak patents on social welfare stems from the legal costs of patent
dispute resolution in court. The use of licensing agreements to deter or settle patent litigation allows
to avoid those direct costs. It however induces an indirect loss in welfare if the licensing contract
that is preferred by the patent holder is socially suboptimal. In the case of an ironclad patent, it is
unclear which type of contracts (royalty or xed fee) is socially preferrable: under royalty licensing
the licensees are less e¢cient than under xed fee licensing but their number is possibly higher under
royalty licensing (see e.g. Kamien, 1992). However, such a tradeo¤ does not exist for uncertain
patents whenever the patent holder prefers to deter litigation (as is very often the case in practice):
in this case the patent holder needs to license all potential users of the technology to deter litigation,
which implies that the number of licensees will be the same under both licensing schemes. In that
case, per-unit royalties are clearly dominated by xed fees from a social perspective.
This paper provides an analysis of the licensing of uncertain patents in a general framework and
derives conditions under which the licensor prefers to use a per-unit royalty contract. In particular,
it is shown that will always be the case for (su¢ciently) weak patents under a mild condition which is
broadly satised under Cournot competition with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition
with di¤erentiated products. A signicant di¤erence with respect to the literature on the licensing
of ironclad patents is that we get a clear-cut result: per-unit royalties are preferred by the holder
of a weak patent independently of the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation
between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market, while
varying any of these three features can overturn the result when ironclad patents are considered.
Our model generates some testable predictions that might be worth investigating. First, our
results suggest that per-unit royalty licenses should be more prevalent in industries with a signicant
proportion of rms holding questionable patents, e.g., industries relying on some new patentable
subject matter (biotechnology, software, business methods,...). Second, if the predictions of our
model are correct then under the presumption that the EPO is more stringent in checking the
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patentability standards than the USPTO, the use of per-unit royalties should be less prevalent in the
EU than in the US.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
All rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
g (r; )  e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r)  (1  )e(n; c  )  0:
We have g (0; ) = 

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )

 

e(n; c)  i(n  1; c  )

 

i(n  1; c)  i(n  1; c  )

> 0 (by A2 and A5) and g (; ) = e(n; c)   i(n   1; c)  
(1  )e(n; c   ) = (1  ) (e(n; c)  e(n; c  )) < 0 (by A2): Combining this with g being
continuous (by A1) and strictly decreasing in r (by A3) yields: i/ the existence and uniqueness of
a solution in r to the equation g (r; ) = 0 (within the interval [0; [), which we denote by ~r(); ii/
the equivalence between the inequalities g (r; )  0 and r  ~r():
Proof of Proposition 2
Since ~Pr (0) = ~PF (0) then ~Pr () > ~PF () for  su¢ciently small if:
d ~Pr ()
d
j=0  
d ~PF ()
d
j=0> 0 (9)
which can be rewritten as:
n~r0 (0) qe(n; c  ) > n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )

because ~r (0) = 0: Moreover di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation
e (n; c  + ~r()) = i (n  1; c  + ~r()) + (1  )e (n; c  ) ;
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we get:
~r0 (0) =
i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  )
@e
@c
(n; c  )
:
Therefore, (9) is equivalent to:
n
i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  )
@e
@c
(n; c  )
qe(n; c  ) > n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )

which can be rewritten as:
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  )
because i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  ) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that F^ () = 0 for  small enough, it is su¢cient to show that the function h(r; ) =
rqe (n; c  + r) + e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r)  (1  )e(n; c  ) is increasing for small
values of r and  (this follows directly from ~r (0) = 0 and r^() being continuous in ). We have:
@h
@r
(0; ) = qe (n; c  ) +
@e
@c
(n; c  )  
@i
@c
(n  1; c  ):
Let us now assume that @
e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe (n; c  ). We need to distinguish between two cases:
- Case 1: @
i
@c
(n  1; c  ) = 0 : in this @h
@r
(0; ) = @h
@r
(0; 0) > 0 for any  2 [0; 1]
- Case 2: @
i
@c
(n 1; c ) 6= 0: in this case @h
@r
(0; ) > 0 for any  2

0;min

1;
qe(n;c )+ @
e
@c
(n;c )
@i
@c
(n 1;c )

.
Therefore, in both cases, @h
@r
(0; ) > 0 for su¢ciently small values of . Using the continuity of
r ! @h
@r
(r; ), we can then state that @h
@r
(r; ) > 0 for su¢ciently small values of r and , which, as
claimed before, is su¢cient to complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Under the per-unit royalty mechanism, the optimal royalty ~rI () for su¢ciently weak patents is
the solution in r to the following equation:
l(n  1; c  + r) = n(n  2; c  + r) + (1  )l(n  1; c  )
and the patent holders overall prot is
~r () = 
p(n  1; c  + ~rI ()) + (n  1) ~rI () q
l(n  1; c  + ~rI ()):
Under the xed fee mechanism, the optimal fee is given by
~FI () = 
h
l(n  1; c  )  n(n  2; c  )
i
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and the patent holders overall prot is then
~F () = 
p(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) 
h
l (n  1; c  )  n (n  2; c  )
i
:
Since ~r (0) = ~F (0) then ~r () > ~F () for  su¢ciently small if
d~r ()
d
j=0>
d~F ()
d
j=0 (10)
which can be rewritten as
~r0I(0)

@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  )

> (n  1)
h
l (n  1; c  )  n (n  2; c  )
i
:
because ~rI(0) = 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation dening ~rI(), we get
~r0I(0):
@l
@c
(n  1; c  ) = n (n  2; c  )  l (n  1; c  )
which yields
~r0I(0) =
n (n  2; c  )  l (n  1; c  )
@l
@c
(n  1; c  )
:
Hence, inequality (10) is equivalent to
n(n 2;c ) l(n 1;c )
@l
@c
(n 1;c )

@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  )

> (n  1)

e (n  1; c  )  i (n  2; c  )

which can be rewritten as
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  ) >   (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  )
or, equivalently, as
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  ) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  ):
Proof of Proposition 5
(a) This follows from the key slope property that every selection of ri satises (see Amir, 1996,
and Amir and Lambson, 2000 for details)
 1 <
ri(Q
0
 i)  ri(Q i)
Q0 i  Q i
< 0 for all Q0 i > Q i: (11)
(b) We rst show that qi is continuously di¤erentiable in ci: Viewed as a correspondence in the
parameter ci, q

i is upper hemi-continuous (or u.h.c.), as a direct consequence of the well-known
property of u.h.c. of the equilibrium correspondence for games with jointly continuous payo¤ func-
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tions (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990). Since qi is also single-valued in c (part (b)), q

i must be
a continuous function. That qi is continuously di¤erentiable in ci follows from the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem applied to the rst order conditions, and the smoothness of P (). That i is also
continuously di¤erentiable in ci follows from the fact that q

i has that same property for all i.
The proof for the parameter cj ; j 6= i; follows along the same lines.
(c) Throughout part (c), x i and denote rm is output, prot and its rivals total outputs at
equilibrium by qi ; 

i and Q

 i respectively when the cost vector is (c1; c2; :::; cn). Denote the same
three variables by bqi; bi and bQ i after rm is cost alone changes to bci > ci, all other rms unit costs
remaining the same. Adding the n rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
nP (Q) +QP 0 (Q) =
nX
k=1
ck: (12)
Since the LHS of (12) is strictly decreasing in Q, the increase in rm is cost from ci to bci increases
the RHS of (12), which causes the solution to (12) to decrease. In other words, bQ < Q.
We now show that for any rm j 6= i, we must have bQ j < Q j . To this end, rst observe thatbQ j + rj( bQ j) = bQ < Q = Q j + rj(Q j). Since (11) holds that Q j + rj(Q j) is increasing in
Q j , we must have bQ j < Q j . For rm j,
bj = bqj hP (bqj + bQ j)  cji
 qj
h
P (qj +
bQ j)  cji by the Cournot property
> qj

P (qj +Q

 j)  cj

since bQ j < Q j
= j :
We now show that for rm i, we must have bQ i > Q i. To this end, rst observe that since for
any j 6= i, rj is strictly decreasing (cf. (11)) and bQ j < Q j , we have bqj = rj( bQ j) > rj(Q j) = qj ,
for every rm j 6= i. Then since bQ i =Pj 6=i bqj and Q i =Pj 6=i qj , we have bQ i > Q i.
To show that i > bi, consider
i = q

i

P (qi +Q

 i)  ci

 bqi P (bqi +Q i)  ci by the Cournot property
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  ci] since bQ i > Q i:
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  bci] since bci > ci
= bi:
For the remaining parts, we consider the case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly (ci = c for all i).
(d) Due to the symmetry of the game, asymmetric equilibria, if any, would come in n-tuples.
Hence, the conclusion follows from part (a) directly.
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(e) Let q denote per rm equilibrium output. Di¤erentiating the rst order condition w.r.t. c;
@q
@c

(n+ 1)P 0 (nq) + nqP" (nq)

= 1: (13)
Using the rst order condition and C3, the term in brackets is strictly negative, so @q

@c
< 0.
We now show that per-rm prot decreases in c. Denote the equilibrium variables by qi ; 

i and
Q i when the unit cost is c, and by q
0
i; 
0
i and Q
0
 i the same variables when the unit cost is c
0 > c:
Di¤erentiating i = q
 [P (nq)  c] with respect to c yields
@i
@c
=
@q
@c
[P (nq)  c] + q

P 0(nq)n
@q
@c
  1

(14)
=
@q
@c
(n+ 1)qP 0(nq)  q by (12)
=  q
2P 0(Q) +QP" (Q)
(n+ 1)P 0 (Q) +QP" (Q)
by (13).
Clearly, C3 implies that 2P 0(Q) +QP" (Q) < 0 for all Q, so the numerator in the above fraction is
< 0. It is then easy to see that the denominator is also < 0. Hence
@i
@c
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 6
Let us show that Condition (8) holds (which implies that both Conditions (6) and (7) hold ).
Total di¤erentiation w.r.t. ci in 
 = (P (Q)  ci) q

i +
X
j 6=i
(P (Q)  cj) q

j yields
@
@ci
= [P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
  1]qi + (P (Q
)  ci)
@qi
@ci
+
X
j 6=i
[P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci
]:
which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci

:
When ci = cj = c, the latter becomes:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  c)
@qj
@ci

=  qi + P
0(Q)
@Q
@ci
X
j
qj + (P (Q
)  c)
X
j
@qj
@ci
=  qi + P
0(Q)
@Q
@ci
:Q + (P (Q)  c)
@Q
@ci
=  qi|{z}
direct e¤ect
+
@Q
@ci

P 0(Q):Q + P (Q)  c

| {z }
strategic e¤ect
: (15)
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Using the Cournot rst order condition yields QP 0(Q) +P (Q)  c = n 1
n
QP 0(Q) < 0: From the
proof of Proposition 6, @Q

@ci
< 0. Hence @Q

@ci
[P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c)] > 0, so @

@ci
>  qi in (15).
Let us now show the second part of this proposition. We have
e(n; c)  e(n; c0)  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) = (P (nqe(n; c))  c)qe(n; c)  (P (nqe(n; c0)  c)qe(n; c0)
=
1
n

(P (Qe(n; c))  c)Qe(n; c)  (P (Qe(n; c0)  c)Qe(n; c0)

:
It is easy to see from C3 and C1 that a monopolists prot (P (Q)  c)Q is concave. Denoting Qm(c)
the monopoly output with marginal cost c, it follows that (P (Q) c)Q is decreasing over the interval
[Qm(c); Qe(n; c)]. From Proposition 7(e), c < c0 implies Qe(n; c0) < Qe(n; c). So the strategic e¤ect
e(n; c) e(n; c0)  (c0  c)qe(n; c0) is negative if Qm(c)  Qe(n; c0). Thus, for Condition (3) to hold
it is su¢cient to have, besides C1-C3, that Qm(c  )  Qe(n; c).
Proof of Proposition 7
For rm i, charging a price of ci strictly dominates any price below ci. Hence, we restrict attention
to the price space [ci;1) as the action set for rm i. Then log i(pi; p i) is well dened.
(a) This is well known, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) or Vives (1999).
(b) The equilibrium price pi is increasing in ci since (i) the price game is log-supermodular (part
(a)), (ii) log i(pi; p i) = log(pi   ci) + logDi(pi; p i) has increasing di¤erences in (pi; ci), from
@2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@ci = (pi   ci)
 2 > 0, and (iii) the constraint set [ci;1) is ascending in ci. So
the conclusion follows from [Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Theorem 7]. That pi is also increasing in
cj for any j 6= i follows from a similar argument since @
2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@cj = 0.
(c) We rst show that every equilibrium price pi is continuously di¤erentiable in cj , for all i,
j: Viewed as a correspondence in the parameter cj , p

i is u.h.c., by the u.h.c. property of the
equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions (jointly in all actions), see
e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990. Since pi is also single-valued in cj (from part (i)), p

i is a continuous
function. Then the fact that pi is continuously di¤erentiable in cj follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem. Finally, continuous di¤erentiability of i follows from that of all the p
0
i s.
(d) Di¤erentiating i = (p

i   ci)Di(p

i ; p

 i) with respect to cj , for i 6= j, yields
@i
@cj
=
@pi
@cj
Di(p

i ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)
X
k
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
: (16)
Using the rst order condition Di(p

i ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)
@Di
@pi
= 0, (16) reduces to
@i
@cj
= (pi   ci)
X
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
 0
since @Di
@pk
> 0 (goods are substitutes) and
@p
k
@cj
 0 from part (b).
(e) When the Bertrand game is symmetric, the unique Bertrand equilibrium must be symmetric,
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for otherwise equilibria would come in pairs.
(f) The argument is the same as for part (b) since @2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@c = (pi   c)
 2 > 0.
(g) From an argument similar to the proof of part (c), p and thus i = (p
   c)Di(p
; p; :::; p)
are di¤erentiable w.r.t. c. We derive an expression for @p

@c
: The FOC at a Bertrand equilibrium is
Di(p
; :::; p) + (p   c)@Di(p
; :::; p)=@pi = 0: (17)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem and di¤erentiating the FOC with respect to c yields0@@Di
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
1A @p
@c
+ (pi   ci)
@p
@c
X
k
@Di
@pk@pi
+ (
@p
@c
  1)
@Di
@pi
= 0:
Hence, using B2 and B4,
@p
@c
=
@Di=@pi
2@Di
@pi
+
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
> 0: (18)
We can di¤erentiate  = (p   c)Di(p
; p; :::; p) with respect to c to obtain
@
@c
= (
@p
@c
  1)Di(p
; :::; p) + (p   c)
@p
@c
X
k
@Di
@pk
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 1 
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
@Di=@pi
@p
@c
#
from (17)
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 1 
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
2@Di
@pi
+
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
#
using (18)
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 
2
P
k
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
2@Di
@pi
+
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
#
< 0 by B2 and B4:
Proof of Proposition 8
Let us show that Condition (8) holds, which implies that both Conditions (6) and (7) hold.
We have  = (pi   ci)D

i +
X
j 6=i

pj   cj

Dj . Then:
@
@ci
=

@pi
@ci
  1

Di + (p

i   ci)
@Di
@ci
+
X
j 6=i

@pj
@ci
Dj + (p

i   ci)
@Dj
@ci

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which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  Di +
X
j

@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@ci

=  Di +
X
j
"
@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
X
k
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
#
=  Di +
X
j
24@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj
:
@pj
@ci
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
35
=  Di +
X
j
26664@p

j
@ci

Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj

| {z }
=0
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
37775
=  Di +
X
j
24 pj   cjX
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
35
We have already shown that
@p
k
@ci
> 0 for any k; i (see the proof for part (b) of Proposition 8).
Moreover, we have
@Dj
@pk
> 0 for any j 6= k (from B2(ii)). It then follows that @

@ci
>  Di =  q

i :
Let us now show the second part of this proposition. Denoting Di(p; p; :::; p) , D(p) and p
e(n; c)
the (common) equilibrium price when the (common) marginal cost is c, we can rewrite the strategic
e¤ect of a decrease in the common marginal cost from c0 to c on individual prots as follows:
e(n; c)  e(n; c0)  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) = (pe(n; c)  c)D(pe(n; c)) 
 
pe(n; c0)  c

D(pe(n; c0):
Using B2 and B4 we can easily show that the function (p  c)D(p), which can be interpreted as the
prot that a multi-product monopolist producing the n varieties and selling them at the same price p
derives from each variety, is concave. Denoting pm(c) , argmax(p c)D(p), it follows that (p c)D(p)
is increasing over [pe(n; c); pm(c)]. We know from part (f) of Proposition 9 that c < c0 implies
pe(n; c) < pe(n; c0). Therefore, we can state that the strategic e¤ect e(n; c) e(n; c0) (c0 c)qe(n; c0)
is negative if pe(n; c0)  pm(c). Thus, for Condition (3) to hold it is su¢cient to suppose, beside
assumptions B1-B4, that pe(n; c)  pm(c  ).
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